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Abstract 
 
We are extending the existing features of Aspen, a powerful economic modeling tool, 
and introducing new features to simulate the role of confidence in economic activity. 
The new model is built from a collection of autonomous agents that represent 
households, firms, and other relevant entities like financial exchanges and 
governmental authorities. We simultaneously model several interrelated markets, 
including those for labor, products, stocks, and bonds. We also model economic trade-
offs, such as decisions of households and firms regarding spending, savings, and 
investment. In this paper, we review some of the basic principles and model 
components and describe our approach and development strategy for emulating 
consumer, investor, and business confidence. The model of confidence is explored 
within the context of economic disruptions, such as those resulting from disasters or 
terrorist events. 
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Approach and Development Strategy  
for an Agent-Based Model of  
Economic Confidence 
 
Introduction 
This paper explores theory and methods for modeling the economic activities and 
confidence of consumers, investors, and businesses. The economic activities include labor, 
production, capital expenditure, consumption, savings, and private investment. In reality, these 
activities occur within a complex system in which many economic actors behave and interact 
according to their internal objectives and constraints. Therefore, we present an agent-based 
approach to explore the complex decisions and interactions of autonomous economic 
participants, called agents, in such a system. The principal types of agents for this application are 
firms and households. 
 
The theory and methods described herein are being applied in a new economic confidence 
model that Sandia National Laboratories is developing for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). This model will allow DHS to analyze through simulation how terrorist acts and 
other types of economic disruptions affect our economy. 
 
This paper is organized as a set of individually referenced topical sections. This first section, 
Introduction, describes the characteristics and benefits of agent-based models, explains the 
methods and assumptions underlying this approach, and gives a brief description of the 
development strategy we are following to build the new economic confidence model. The second 
section, Terror and Confidence, points out the various definitions that are used to describe 
economic confidence and addresses the relationship between terrorism and economic confidence. 
In the third section, Overview of Firms, we present our approach to implementing the firms, 
including their actions, their means of maximizing profit and determining production levels, and 
the planning algorithms that the firms employ in making decisions regarding prices and 
production levels. Examples are included to augment the discussion. In the fourth section, 
Overview of Households, we present our approach to implementing the households, including 
their actions; their means of consumption; their methods of borrowing, saving, and planning for 
the future; and the algorithms that the households employ in making decisions regarding 
consumption and saving. As with firms in the previous section, examples are provided to 
augment the discussion. The fifth and last section, Price Formation in the Stock Market, briefly 
touches on how investors participate in the stock market. 
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Background 
Agent-based modeling generally refers to a computational approach that uses many 
independently functioning agents. Each agent is created from a software design and instantiated 
on a computer network, wherein the agents process information and pass messages. Each agent 
has access to certain information and the ability to communicate with other agents. Agents 
conduct their activities iteratively or continuously until the simulation halts. Generally, each 
agent is allowed to formulate a unique set of information upon which to act, thus allowing the 
agents to become unique. Additionally, agents are often designed with evolutionary algorithms, 
which allow the agents to learn about their environment and formulate unique sets of decision 
rules. Agent-based models are often used to observe aggregate activity for a population of 
agents, to observe how agents’ decision rules can change as they adapt to their environment, and 
to determine distinct sets of equilibriums or end states for the model. 
 
We expand upon a growing collection of Aspen1 agent-based models that are used for the 
purpose of economic simulation. These models use classes of agents that simulate economic 
entities such as firms, banks, households, exchanges, and governments. For example, households 
might supply labor to firms in exchange for a wage. Firms transform labor into products, which 
are then sold to households for a price. Households and firms interact by passing messages, such 
as job postings, job applications, paychecks, and purchases. Similar activities are simulated for 
banks, governments, and other economic agents. 
New Features 
We extend existing agent-based models by adding features like a stock market and long-
term financial plans to model consumer, investor, and business confidence. We pursue these 
extensions by incorporating the prerequisite principle of intertemporal substitution. This 
principle refers to a trade-off between having something now and having it later. For example, 
whenever a household saves money for a future vacation, it substitutes intertemporally (across 
time) because it is choosing to spend (consume) less now so that it can consume more in the 
future. Similarly, whenever a household borrows a car loan, it substitutes intertemporally 
because it obtains use of the car now, though it will give up some of its disposable income in the 
future until the loan is paid off. 
 
Consumer confidence is specific to household agents and refers to households’ confidence in 
their future income streams. If households become concerned that their future income streams 
are in jeopardy (by risk of wage cuts or layoffs), they might also worry that they will not be able 
to support their planned spending patterns.2 This might lead many households to spend less and 
save more to lessen the potential impact if future income does fall. Spending less and saving 
more is a form of intertemporal substitution in which a household reallocates current 
consumption3 to the future. This action unfortunately exacerbates economic slowdowns by 
                                                 
1 Developed by Sandia National Laboratories by Richard Pryor, Dianne Barton, David Schoenwald, et al. 
2 Factors not related to employment and income that might affect consumer confidence are beyond the scope of 
this discussion. 
3 Consumption refers to the use of final goods and services purchased by households for their own use.  
Consumption excludes household purchases made for the purpose of producing and selling goods and services. For 
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reducing sales to consumers, which reduces the revenues of firms and creates pressure on firms 
to cut wages and lay off employees. 
 
Investor confidence [in our model] is also specific to household agents. Households invest in 
stocks for the uncertain prospect of earning capital gains, a form of future income, for the sake of 
future consumption.4 If households become concerned that their future wealth and income 
streams are in jeopardy as a result of falling stock prices and dividends, they might also worry 
that they will not be able to support their planned spending patterns. This might lead many 
households to convert stock holdings into less risky assets such as bonds or cash savings. 
Unfortunately, this action exacerbates the problem by driving stock prices down and reducing the 
capitalization of firms. 
 
Business confidence is specific to firm agents and refers to firms’ confidence in their profit 
streams and in their ability to raise capital via the stock market. If firms become concerned that 
their future profit streams are in jeopardy (by risk of declining consumer demand), they might 
also worry that they will not be able to support planned capital and payroll expenditures. This 
might lead many firms to cut costs, reduce planned capital expenditures, freeze hiring, cut wages 
or lay off employees in order to reduce the impact of potential revenue shortfalls and maintain 
profitability. These actions unfortunately exacerbate the problem by reducing household income 
and convincing households to reallocate more income into savings. Stock markets magnify the 
issue by increasing the pressure on firms to demonstrate short-term profitability in order to 
satisfy investors. 
 
We introduce the stock market to allow households to trade current consumption for stock in 
firms. Households do so with the expectation of earning capital gains, which translate into future 
consumption. This market also allows firms to exchange stock in their business for working 
capital. A firm that participates in the stock market must account for the prospect that poor 
financial performance can impact investors’ relative confidence in the firm and reduce the firm’s 
level of capitalization, thereby hindering the firm’s ability to plan. Similarly, a household that 
buys stock must account for the prospect that stock prices can reduce the household’s wealth, 
thereby limiting its ability to plan. The stock market, combined with banking and bonds markets, 
will provide a reasonably comprehensive model of financial markets. 
                                                                                                                                                             
example, a household’s purchases of office products for a home business are not included as household 
consumption; such items are considered intermediate goods used for the creation of additional goods and services.  
As demonstrated above, goods and services are classified as intermediate or final based on their intended use.  
Intermediate goods are those used to produce other goods for sale to firms or households, whereas final goods are 
those sold strictly to households and strictly for “personal” use. As a rule-of-thumb, final goods and services are 
those purchases by households that are classified as personal expenses, rather than as business expenses, for tax 
purposes. 
4 We note that many firms are capitalized primarily by institutional investors rather than by individual 
investors. However, distinctions between the investment behavior when funds are controlled by institutional traders 
rather than by individual investors are beyond the scope of this paper. We simply assert that such institutions derive 
their funds in some fashion from households, and that households’ incentives are key to aggregate investment 
behavior.   
 
 10 
Why Agent-Based Models?  
Agent-based models offer a number of benefits in the analysis of complex systems:  
 
First, from a practical perspective, agent-based models provide a distinct platform for 
operational analysis because the agents and their decisions and interactions can be described 
intuitively rather than abstractly, as is the case for sophisticated mathematics and subtle 
assumptions. 
 
Second, agent-based models are well suited for a population of decision makers that have a 
diverse set of characteristics, as compared with analytical methods that often require restrictive 
simplifying assumptions.   
 
Third, agent-based models allow us to model complex sets of relationships that cannot be 
explicitly modeled using statistics-based econometrics due to issues of data availability, degrees 
of freedom, or collinearity. And even when statistical methods provide predictive models, these 
methods generally do not allow the analyst to explore many underlying relationships5 (whether 
or not such underlying relationships are even explicitly represented in the statistical model). In 
contrast, simulations can measure and record, for analysis, all data that are explicit to the 
underlying processes in the simulations. Further, econometric methods usually estimate 
empirical relationships according to an observed data range, but such estimates often break down 
when extrapolating outside of that range.6 In contrast, one can verify agent simulations from the 
ground up according to the underlying distribution of input parameters and then run the 
simulation for scenarios that have never occurred. 
 
A fourth benefit of agent-based models relates to the quantification of variables. 
Conventional comparative-static methods generally assume that an economic system is initially 
in some sort of equilibrium state. These methods analyze how changes in certain variables will 
move the system toward a new equilibrium state. Sometimes, however, the changes are derived 
without quantifying the equilibrium states. In contrast, simulations of agent-based models allow 
us to quantify all variables so that the observer can compare each variable before and after an 
event and observe the path of each variable to its new equilibrium, no matter how complex the 
system. 
 
Fifth, agent-based models can provide a unique opportunity to study behavior over time. We 
incorporate evolutionary learning algorithms, such as genetic programs, into the agents. Learning 
algorithms, in general, have many applications and serve many purposes. In microeconomic 
simulation, they are particularly advantageous in allowing the analyst to relax assumptions 
regarding decision-making processes. For example, more conventional economic models 
typically assume that economic decision makers optimize according to the first- and second-
order conditions of a fixed, twice-differentiable utility function. Such models are often powerful 
and useful for the study of underlying economic forces (under the assumption that economic 
                                                 
5 Parametric statistical models rarely allow for sound investigation of high-dimensional nth-order relationships.  
Rather, such models are usually limited to a few first- or second-order relationships.   
6 Statistically estimated relationships are local projections of more complex relationships. This sort of 
projection does not allow for backward projection outside the “relevant” range.   
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decision makers have perfect information), but they are not particularly useful for the study of 
behavior when decision makers know or understand little about their environment or their 
internal motivations. Agent modeling, on the other hand, employs learning algorithms to study 
how economic decision makers learn to respond to various choices under conditions of limited 
information and understanding. 
Methods and Assumptions 
The agent-based approach is unlike the traditional econometric approach in which empirical 
data are fitted to parametric models of measurable variables. Agent-based methods are more akin 
to network flow methods wherein the modeler designs the components of a system, attributes 
those components with certain functionality, assigns initial and boundary conditions, executes a 
search algorithm, and examines the final state of the model components. In the case of agent-
based models, the modeler designs classes of agents to consider certain information, attributes 
those agents with certain functionality for sharing and processing information, instantiates 
populations of the agents, assigns initial and boundary conditions, executes the simulation for a 
duration of time periods, and examines the data generated by the activity of individual agents 
within the various agent classes. We therefore require substantial understanding about the 
underlying information, decisions, and transactions that are pertinent to real-world economic 
participants. 
 
We employ generally accepted assumptions of economic behavior, when appropriate, as 
demonstrated in our design of household agents. Household behavior takes center stage in the 
model of confidence. We use the term household in the classic economic sense to refer to a 
standard unit of labor and consumer behavior.7 
   
                                                 
7 Individual choices are intertwined within the household but are more-or-less independent from other 
households. For example, two individuals who form a family generally make certain joint decisions and joint 
purchases. In such cases, it is difficult or impossible, even in a theoretical formulation, to distinguish ownership and 
use of common purchases and assets between the two individuals; it is also difficult or impossible to distinguish the 
relative influence of each individual’s preferences toward a common decision. These sorts of difficulties are largely 
avoided by studying the household as a composite decision maker whose behavior is determined by a bundle of 
weighted preferences corresponding to the members of the household. 
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Household decisions will require sound models of utility8 and financial planning to simulate 
how households balance between current and future levels of consumption and how they choose 
to save and invest along a time horizon. This paper addresses these requirements by drawing 
upon decades of empirically supported household theory. In accordance with theory, we assume 
that households will estimate their budget constraint based on their wealth and expected income 
stream. We assume that households will estimate their utility, which we assume is related to the 
present value of consumption across many time periods. We assume that households prefer 
current consumption to future consumption and that households experience decreasing utility 
from consumption within any single time period. We make these assumptions because they are 
consistent with conventional wisdom and general knowledge of economic behavior. 
 
Conversely, we avoid many assumptions that are used strictly to simplify the mathematics of 
economic theory. For example, we do not assume that households have perfect information. We 
do not assume that the households know (or even try to estimate) the distributions of stochastic 
variables (if stochastic processes are in the model). We employ a conventional log-linear utility 
                                                 
8 Utility is an abstract concept used to study choices. Introductory lectures often describe utility as a generic 
measure of value or benefit or “happiness” derived by households from various forms of consumption, which 
usually provides a sufficient working definition of what we mean by utility. However, this description can be 
misleading, particularly in a contemporary culture that increasingly understands and embraces psychological 
principles such as compulsive, addictive, and self-destructive behavior. Thus, the aforementioned descriptions of 
utility (i.e., value, benefit, happiness) provide an inadequate context for introducing the economic principle of 
rationality and rational agents.  Problems often arise as follows. When the concepts of utility and rationality are 
introduced in the simplest and most direct terms (as is usually the case), they imply an assumption that “all people 
behave rationally in their own best interest,” which fails the prima facie litmus test applied by most audiences and 
leads many non-economists to reject economic thought and models outright. We must be clear. Utility is a model of 
predictive behavior, but it does not necessarily define the motivation behind such behavior. For example, when 
someone chooses option A over option B, they do so because they were motivated by some combination of internal 
factors, e.g., self-interest, psychological compulsion, subconscious desire, greed, charity, anonymous sacrifice, or an 
indifferent flipping of a coin. We do not intend to imply that the individual is “better off” by choosing A according 
to any preconceived social notion, or even that the individual is introspectively satisfied with the decision. We only 
intend to imply that the factors that motivated the individual’s decision are relevant to the decision that was made.  
For example, suppose we conduct two experiments in which an individual is internally motivated to choose option A 
over option B, and similarly motivated to choose option B over option C. We simply define utility to be an ordinal 
ranking such that the utility of option A is greater than the utility of option B for this individual, and that the utility 
of option B is greater than the utility of option C for this individual. The purpose for such an ordinal ranking is to 
define preferences, leading to predictive models of behavior. To continue, the individual above had two choices with 
two options each. We shall define an ordinal ranking called utility, U, to examine the choices. In the first choice, we 
found that the utility of option A, U(A), was greater than the utility of option B; that is, U(A) ≥ U(B). The second 
choice revealed that U(B) ≥ U(C). We define preference to conclude that A is preferred to B and that B is preferred 
to C, as was demonstrated by the individual in the two experimental choices above. However, the utility concept 
allows us to consider all three options together as a set of preferences: U(A) ≥ U(B) ≥ U(C). The ordinal properties 
of utility lead us to predict that A is preferred to C, even though there was no experiment for this choice. That is, 
based on our utility model, we predict that given a choice of A or C, the individual will be motivated to choose A.  
Similarly, given a choice of A, B, or C, the individual will choose A. Our only assumption is that the agent is 
internally consistent (whatever the motivating factors), not that the agent conforms to some external notion of 
rationality. Note: This simple introduction does not address the many extensions to the application of utility theory, 
such as the notions that “people learn” or “people guess” or “people get confused” or “people change” or “people 
grow,” and we do not intend to review a century’s worth of utility theory here, although we do expand on some of 
these notions later as pertinent to this paper. This brief discussion was intended merely to clarify our use of the terms 
utility, preference, and rationality in the context of household choice. 
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function for each household, but we do not assume that any household can define its own utility 
function or its first-order optimality conditions.   
 
In summary, agent-based microeconomic simulation can draw from many of the results 
from economic research without being restricted by some of the conventional research methods. 
Development Strategy 
For the new economic confidence model, we will design and build a software prototype 
using the C++ programming language. This prototype will provide an agent-based model in 
which C++ classes will represent economic agents. Upon execution of the program, the classes 
will be instantiated as objects, which will represent economic agents. The agents will perform 
functions, such as computation and message passing, in a sequence of time steps. Messages will 
be read from and written to a queue. Some agents will contain decision rules and learning 
algorithms that will determine their behavior. 
 
We rely heavily on the object-oriented principle of inheritance. This approach allows us to 
introduce complexity in well-documented phases. For example, we used a simple household 
class to design and verify a simultaneous model of the labor and product markets with minimal 
complexity. We subsequently created a bonds household class to introduce into the model the 
principle of household finance via a bonds market. The bonds household class inherits the simple 
household class and includes only those methods and variables necessary for interacting in the 
bonds market. 
 
The analyst will design simulations, i.e., scenarios, using a graphical user interface (GUI). 
The GUI will allow the analyst to specify certain global properties, such as the number of agents, 
as well as properties and initial conditions for the agents. The analyst will also use input files to 
specify the characteristics of agents, such as initial amount of cash holdings or lists-of-
employees. We describe our approach for modeling firms and households in the following 
sections of this paper. 
 
 
Aspen provides a versatile platform for development and modeling. However, we will 
design agents and algorithms for portability so that they may be modified and incorporated into 
other platforms. 
Model Components and Complexity 
We will develop an increasingly complex model of the macroeconomy as appropriate for 
modeling confidence and confidence-related activities. To do so, we will adopt various existing 
Aspen features as needed, such as taxation, unemployment programs, and bond and credit 
markets. We will also explore the impacts of macroeconomic characteristics such as aging, 
generation bulges, and interest rates. 
 
In the case of complex decisions in simultaneous markets, we will identify joint 
equilibriums and evaluate the model based on its convergence to those equilibriums. We will 
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explore the role of learning and compare the behavior of agents under different assumptions and 
algorithms. 
Empirics and Validation 
Empirical economic research utilizes statistical (econometric) methods to model 
relationships between measured economic variables. We intend to statistically model the 
variables in the simulation and compare our results with econometric findings.   
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Terror and Confidence 
Economic confidence is an abstraction without strict definition. Some define confidence in 
terms of indexes calculated from survey data. Others refer to confidence as an underlying 
immeasurable determinant of producer and consumer demand. However, any definition of 
confidence must surely relate to expectations and perception of risks and uncertainties. For 
example, consumer confidence is derived from, or defined by, a household’s expectations for 
financial stability, risk, and opportunities. Investor confidence is based on many factors, 
including economic stability and growth. Business confidence is based on expectations for 
market demand. New risks or increased uncertainties will impact expectations and cause various 
households and firms to react in various ways, depending in part upon their assets and wealth, 
time horizon, and risk preferences. Thus, the discussion of confidence ultimately revolves around 
a discussion of economic and financial expectations. New information regarding economic and 
financial variables will therefore influence confidence. 
 
In a general sense, we would expect confidence to be detrimentally impacted by new 
information in two ways. First, we would expect most households and firms to downgrade their 
expectations in response to new information of previously unaccounted economic or financial 
risks. Second, we would expect risk-averse households and firms to downgrade their 
expectations in response to new uncertainties regarding economic and financial conditions. 
 
The relationship between terrorism and economic confidence is unclear. Some suggest that 
confidence was reasonably robust in the wake of 9/11 (Garner 2002; Shapiro 2003). Others 
suggest that increased uncertainties can reduce confidence and substantively harm the economy 
(Desroches and Gosselin 2002). 
 
The question of confidence is part of a broader set of questions regarding the economic 
impact of terrorism. The DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security) is pursuing answers to 
such questions through various means, such as through the Homeland Security Center for Risk 
and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events, as well as through other portfolios. There are many 
methods and data sources for analyzing questions of security and risk, but many new 
computational capabilities will only enhance our nation’s ability to define and address the 
relevant questions. We anticipate that agent-based modeling will provide a useful framework for 
both (1) modeling economic decisions and (2) capturing information from data sources. 
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Overview of Firms 
The basic purpose of a firm in our model is to produce and sell products in the marketplace 
in order to earn profits. Firm-based production has become the societal norm in most cultures 
because firms can generally acquire labor and capital in amounts and proportions that make them 
more productive (efficient) than alternative approaches to production. This is so much the case 
that one can scarcely imagine a household that grows its own food, weaves its own cloth, and 
provides its own entertainment. Productive efficiency creates higher per-capita product, which 
can be distributed among the workers, owners of capital, and consumers. In a money economy, 
these benefits are distributed in the form of higher wages, higher profits, and lower prices. 
 
We will design a simulation in which the firms learn to plan production levels via decision 
algorithms to optimize some measure of profit. This approach requires that the firms search for 
optimal decision rules for the set of possible economic states. The simulation framework requires 
that each firm continually recalculate its profit (fitness) to determine whether its decisions have 
made it better off.   
 
In general, firms purchase input factors, produce and sell products, and attempt to do so in a 
fashion that maximizes profit. We will design a C++ class to handle the data structures and 
methods that are required by firms. Examples of data structures might include a list of employees 
or an array of consumer-request messages. An example of a method might include a production 
function that translates input factors into products for sale in the market. 
 
Key aspects of our implementation of firms include the following: 
 
• Inventory and payroll. Each firm will establish an inventory record, which will be credited 
whenever the firm produces new quantities of the corresponding product and debited 
whenever the firm sells the product in the marketplace. Each firm will also establish a payroll 
record for each employee to record the employee’s wage and ID number. Records will be 
added and deleted each time an employee is hired, fired, or quits.   
 
• Profit and accounting. Each firm will maintain business records, such as sales price, cost, 
revenue, profit, and excess demand, which will be updated with each new series of 
transactions. 
 
• Choices and decisions. Each firm will seek to optimize some set of objectives. The firm’s 
objectives will generally be defined by some measure of financial fitness such as profit. All 
activities and decisions of the firm will relate to such fitness measures. The foremost decision 
will be to determine production levels. Related to that decision will be decisions regarding 
employment and pricing.   
 
• Message passing. Each firm will read and send messages for various purposes. Some 
messages, e.g., job advertisements, will be posted publicly for general access. Other 
messages, such as job offers, will be sent privately to a specific identified agent. Similarly, 
some of the messages that a firm reads might be public postings like an advertisement of 
intermediated goods available for purchase, or private messages like a job application. 
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Profit Maximization 
The classic theory of the firm assumes that firms optimize their profit function under a cost 
constraint. We consider the simplest example of such optimization. A firm pays wage “w” to 
employees for “L” hours of labor at a total cost of C = wּL. The firm produces “q” units of 
product as a function of labor: q = q(L). The firm sells its product at price “p” for a total revenue 
of R = pּq. If we suppose for this example that wages and price are determined exogenously, 
then profit “π” is given by π = R – C = pּq(L) – wּL. The firm will maximize profit under the 
following first-order condition: 
 
∂π/∂L = pּ∂q/∂L – w = 0, 
which implies 
∂q/∂L = w/p. 
 
The term “∂q/∂L” is called the marginal product of labor and depends on the technology 
used by the firm to transform labor into product. The properties of the function q(L) determine 
the profit choices facing the firm. For example, consider a simplistic case in which q(L) is linear: 
q = kּL; in this case, the firm can only earn a positive profit if k > wּL/p. Such a firm faces a 
simple choice: to produce or not produce based on wages and prices. 
 
Economists incorporate concepts such as economies of scale and diminishing returns into 
this exercise by assuming that the production function can be approximated by a function that is 
twice differentiable with a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative. That is, 
production increases with labor, but at a decreasing rate. So the firm will only choose to engage 
in production if there is a range of production (i.e., a range of L and q) at which ∂q/∂L ≥ w/p. 
However, the firm is limited to how much it can produce profitably. Eventually, the firm reaches 
a critical quantity of labor L* beyond which ∂q/∂L ≤ w/p. Thus, L* represents the profit-
maximizing production level. 
 
These examples assume that prices and wages are fixed, and that the firm only decides 
whether to produce and how much to produce. There are industries where these conditions hold 
more-or-less, but firms in most industries usually have some control over the wages they pay and 
the prices they charge. Firms set wages to try to gain an advantage in the labor (input) market, 
and they set prices to try to gain an advantage in the product (output) market. We will discuss 
these more complicated sets of choices later, but first we explore the choice of production in the 
context of learning algorithms. 
Cobweb Models 
Cobweb9 models are simple iterative exercises that examine how a firm chooses its 
production level when it is uncertain about the price it will obtain for its product. Cobweb 
models assume that there exists an equilibrium price and quantity that balances the supply and 
demand, but that the market begins out of equilibrium. That is, the production levels are initially 
                                                 
9 The term “cobweb” arises because a cobweb model results in a series of price and quantity movements, 
which (when plotted on a standard graph of supply and demand curves) resemble a cobweb. 
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either too high (which implies a surplus of products), or the production levels are too low (which 
implies a shortage of products).     
 
As we saw in our previous examples from our discussion of profit maximization, firms in a 
competitive market optimize by setting their production levels with respect to the market price 
for their product. Suppose, for example, that production levels are initially too low in the first 
period. In a competitive market, the market price will be relatively high (compared to the 
equilibrium price). The simple cobweb model supposes that firms will increase production levels 
for the second period based upon the currently high price. However, as firms introduce more 
units of product into a competitive market, the market price is driven below the equilibrium 
price. If the firms plan third-period production levels based on the low price in the second period, 
then they will underproduce, which will return the market once again to an excessively high 
price. As we iterate through time, we see a series of overcompensations by which the firms 
oscillate between overproduction and underproduction.   
 
Ezekiel (1938) posed the cobweb theorem to explore whether price and production, if 
disturbed from their equilibrium, tend to gravitate back toward that normal. Cobweb models are 
used to explore the conditions under which the market (1) converges to equilibrium, (2) diverges 
away from equilibrium, or (3) oscillates. The outcome depends on the structure of the supply and 
demand schedules, as well as the method used by the firms to forecast prices. These models have 
more modern implications for the study of rational expectations and monetary policy.   
 
For our purposes, cobweb models demonstrate the importance of expectations and 
forecasting in the definition of firm agents for an agent-based economic simulation because these 
models allow us to validate the performance of the simulation under certain definable test 
conditions. 
Learning Algorithms 
Arifovic (1994) summarizes some algorithmic extensions to a cobweb model. In the 
simplest algorithm, the firm just uses the current market price as its expectation for the next 
period’s price. Ezekiel (1938) found under this scenario that prices and production will converge 
to equilibrium when the elasticity of supply and demand satisfies certain conditions (this is 
known as the stable case), but that prices and production will diverge when those conditions do 
not hold (this is known as the unstable case). In slightly more sophisticated algorithms, the firm 
might use past prices to forecast future prices based upon a sample-average or least-squares 
criterion. We appreciate all of these approaches and will likely use such methods for the purpose 
of testing. However, these approaches all lead to aggregate behavior that is artifactual of the 
rules imposed by the algorithm; that is, they do not allow the firms to be creative in learning how 
to plan production.   
 
Arifovic presents a genetic algorithm by which firms can learn to set production. Each firm 
selects a binary string from a set of strings that correspond to incremental levels of production. 
Once a string is chosen, it is assigned a fitness based on the subsequent observed profit. Arifovic 
compared the genetic algorithm to the aforementioned forecasting approaches; she found that the 
genetic algorithm performed more desirably based on two criteria.   
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First, the genetic algorithm converged to equilibrium for both the stable case and the 
unstable case, whereas the sample-average approach failed to converge for the unstable case. We 
assert that convergence under normal conditions is a desirable result because we do not find 
empirical or experimental evidence of market prices that diverge in an oscillatory fashion based 
on increasing overcompensation by firms.   
 
Second, the genetic algorithm exhibited price fluctuations prior to convergence, and the 
variance of those fluctuations was greater for the unstable case than for the stable case. In 
contrast, the variance of price fluctuations for the least-squares approach (which converged for 
both stable and unstable cases) did not differ. We assert that different variances for the stable and 
unstable cases is a desirable result because the firms have more to learn in the unstable case; 
thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that prices and production would fluctuate more for the 
unstable case on their path to equilibrium. 
Production Planning 
In reality, production planning is usually more complicated than simply selecting the 
number of units to produce. Below, we explore a few of the most common issues facing firms as 
they determine production levels.  
 
We will define firm agents that determine their own production rate and store their output in 
an inventory. The firms will fulfill orders from customers out of the existing inventory. Using 
one or more genetic algorithms or similar methods, the firms will try to determine the production 
rate that maximizes profit subject to a series of cost constraints. Fitness for these algorithms will 
be defined by profit. 
Capacity, Utilization, and Fixed Versus Variable Expenditures 
The scale of a firm’s operation usually refers to its production level and to the bundle of 
resources and assets, such as capital, labor, resources, and management, by which the firm 
operates. Economists split these resources and assets into two general categories: fixed costs, 
which determine capacity, and variable costs, which determine utilization. An increase in fixed 
(long-term) capital expenditures, such as facilities, vehicles, or machinery, will subsequently 
lead to an increase in capacity. For a given capacity, firms may purchase variable (short-term) 
inputs, such as fuel and energy, contract labor, office supplies, or transportation services, that 
will determine the level of utilization of the existing capacity. 
 
An increase in capacity will clearly be accompanied by an increase in fixed costs. However, 
an increase in capacity will usually reduce the variable costs of production by allowing the 
variable inputs to combine more efficiently. Firms seek the most profitable balance of fixed and 
variable costs.   
 
Firms can face various scaling costs when they increase their scale, such as costs pertaining 
to recruiting and training, capital acquisition, and process re-engineering. Similarly, firms can 
face costs when they decrease their scale, such as costs associated with severance packages or 
capital write-offs. Thus, depending on the nature of a firm’s industry, a firm will often seek to 
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maintain relatively steady levels of employment and capital instead of responding to every 
fluctuation in demand and market price. 
 
There are no precise criteria for distinguishing fixed costs from variable costs. Such 
classifications depend on the life cycle of the input, the scaling costs, and the time frame being 
considered. However, general distinctions for broad classification of expenditures are useful for 
financial planning. 
 
In this paper, we refer to the scale of production as a blend of both fixed and variable 
expenditures, without distinguishing between the two.   
Inventories and Production Rates 
In product markets, firms often store inventories of their product to maintain steady rates of 
production in the face of fluctuations in demand. Such firms try to plan their production rate so 
that inventories are large enough to satisfy surges in demand but small enough to keep inventory 
costs reasonably low. 
 
Firms that maintain inventories expect those inventories to fluctuate within a planned range. 
However, if the demand for a firm’s goods changes drastically, or for a sustained period of time, 
inventories will grow or decline outside of the planned range. This indicates to the firm that 
current production rates might no longer be appropriate for market demand, and can lead the firm 
to either increase its scale (if inventories are falling) or reduce its scale (if inventories are rising). 
 
Firms plan production levels based on expected profitability, which is determined in part by 
input and output prices. In some markets, such as those for crude oil and other commodities, 
firms must plan production far in advance, before input and output prices are known. Thus, firms 
can suffer losses stemming from unfavorable price changes that occur after production has been 
planned. When inventory costs are low, firms might respond to such price changes by allowing 
inventories to grow until demand increases. However, inventory costs in some industries can be 
prohibitively high. Many such industries (those with long planning horizons and high inventory 
costs) have futures markets, and firms in these industries can hedge against unfavorable price 
changes by buying or selling futures contracts for pending deliveries months before the 
commodity is actually delivered.   
Budget Constraint 
In our model, firms will obtain working funds from three sources. The firms will (1) collect 
revenue from the sales of products, (2) borrow funds in the credit markets at an interest rate, and 
(3) issue stock to raise capital. 
Financial Planning 
Firms address their objectives over a multiple-period time horizon by forecasting demand 
for their products. From these forecasts, they devise business plans, which specify outlays of 
fixed capital (i.e., fixed-capital investments), and planned levels of payroll, purchases, and 
revenues. The business plan describes a multiple-period estimate of profits over some specified 
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time horizon to demonstrate that the present value of future profits will exceed the costs of the 
initial capital outlay for the venture. The business plan also provides a discounted cash-flow 
analysis, which considers initial capital outlays and computes the discounted net present value of 
the proposed venture.  
 
In a simple model, the present value of profit (π) from a future time period is discounted by 
the interest rate (r) as follows: 
 
PV(πt) = π t/(1 + r)t–1, 
 
where πt is the amount of profit that will be earned “t” periods in the future. For example, 
suppose that πt = $100 is a future profit that will be earned in six months, and r = 2% is a 
monthly interest rate. We have t = 6 to represent six monthly time periods until the future profit 
is realized. Thus, the present value of the future profit is 
 
PV(π6) = $100/(1.02)6 = $88.80. 
 
The present value of the profit stream, which is the set of future profits (π{t}), is calculated by 
summing across all such future time periods: 
 
PV(π{t}) = ∑ πt/(1 + r)t–1. 
 
In our simulation, each firm corresponds to a single venture involving the production and 
sale of its product. Thus, the firm must simply forecast its costs and revenues to estimate the 
present value of its expected profit stream. Of course, the accuracy of forecasts of costs will 
depend in part upon the accuracy of forecasting wages and input prices. Similarly, the accuracy 
of forecasting revenues will depend on the accuracy of forecasting product prices. Unexpected 
changes in wages and prices can increase or decrease profits from their expected levels. Thus, 
firms must constantly re-evaluate their production plans based upon changing prices. 
Planning Algorithms 
We will employ various types of algorithms at various stages of development to support the 
following decision process. In each planning phase, the firm computes its current fitness (derived 
from profit-related variables), determines its current state of being, and specifies the values for 
choice variables like price and production level. The second variable, production level10, will be 
translated into more direct variables, such as number of employees, wage rate, or capital 
expenditure.   
 
Aspen provides a library of documented algorithms to be employed when appropriate. For 
example, Slepoy and Pryor (2002) showed that genetic algorithms provide firm agents with an 
effective pricing model that achieves Nash equilibrium. We will draw from and add to the 
collection of decision algorithms as needed.   
                                                 
10 To clarify, we use the term production level to refer to the level of production in a single period, which might 
alternatively be called the production rate. That is, we use the terms production level and production rate 
interchangeably. 
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Fitness 
Fitness will be defined by the present value of a forecasted profit stream: 
 
PV(π{t}) = ∑ πt/(1 + r)t–1. 
 
Of course, future profit is a function of several uncertain prices and wages: πt = πt (product 
and input prices, wage rate, inventory charges). Let pte ≡ E[pt] denote the expected price in future 
time “t”. The expected future profit is πte = pte⋅Q – C(pXte, wte, cte), where pXte denotes the 
expected price of inputs, wte denotes the expected wage rate, and cte denotes the expected 
inventory cost per unit. The expected present value of the future profit stream is 
 
PV(πe{t}) = ∑ πte/(1 + re)t–1,  
 
which also depends on the forecasted interest rate re. Changes to expectation will directly change 
the discounted value of the expected profit stream. 
State Variables 
We address the uncertainties described above by introducing a set of state variables (Ψ) to 
represent exogenous variables in the utility function. We suggest a few specific state variables in 
this paper (see Example of an Assessment Step below), but the choice of state variables will 
likely be modified in the course of model development. 
Pricing 
We intend to design scenarios that will reasonably emulate competitive markets with many 
suppliers. Thus, firms have a vested interest in accurately forecasting the equilibrium price, p*. If 
a firm sets its price above the market, then most or all consumers will purchase from other firms, 
leaving the overpriced firm with excess inventory and lower profits (possibly negative). If a firm 
set its price below the market, then it should get many buyers and is likely to sell out its 
inventory; however, the firm’s profits will be lower than they could have been at market price. In 
the simplest pricing scenarios, we will require firms to forecast the market price, then set their 
own prices equal to the market price: pfirm = pmarket = p(Ψ). 
 
Eventually, we could explore firms that take different strategies toward pricing, or we could 
explore firms that learn or converge upon various pricing strategies, but we will not address these 
possibilities here. 
Production 
A firm will seek to determine an optimal level of production based upon price forecasts, 
upon its current inventory of product (VQ) and inputs (VX), and upon its labor force (L):  
 
Q = Q(p*, VQ, VX, L, Ψ). 
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Hiring and Purchasing 
A firm might also explicitly make decisions regarding the purchase of inputs or the hiring of 
labor. That is, a firm might determine its target labor (L) based on the same (or similar) variables 
used to determine its production level:  
 
L = L(p*, VQ, VX, L, Ψ). 
 
Similarly, a firm might use those variables to determine the purchase of nonlabor inputs (X): 
 
X = L(p*, VQ, VX, L, Ψ). 
Remarks 
We have listed four types of choice variables: product price, production level, and input 
factors (labor and other). The following examples describe a highly tentative approach for 
allowing firms to specify these variables. It remains to be determined how to best design 
algorithms for selecting these variables.   
Example of an Assessment Step 
In any planning phase, a firm (given its current state) must plan for future demand, which 
involves price and quantity. Thus, the firm must determine whether to raise, lower, or maintain 
the current price, and whether to increase, decrease, or maintain current production levels.   
 
Regardless of the type of algorithms employed, firms will (1) identify their current state and 
(2) respond accordingly. For example, consider three direct state variables corresponding to 
profit, as listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definition of State Variables 
ψ1 = 1 
= 0 
if profit is increasing: dπt/dt > 0 
otherwise 
ψ2 = 1 
= 0 
if inventory is increasing: dVq/dt > 0 
otherwise 
ψ3 = 1 
= 0 
if average costs are increasing: {C/Q}t  > {C/Q}t–1 
otherwise 
 
In this case, we have n = 3 state variables. For any such collection of n Boolean (true or 
false) state variables, there are N = 2n states. In this case, we have N = 23 = 8 states for period t, 
where the set of possible direct states in period t is denoted by Ψt = Ψ{ψ1t, ψ2t, ψ3t}. 
 
We might also want firms to respond with regard to state transitions. We introduce a new set 
of Markov states: Φt = Φ{Ψt, Ψt-1}. There are Mt = NtּNt–1 possible Markov states (in our model, 
N and M are constant across time). For this example, we have the following N = 8 direct states: 
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Ψ ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 0 
3 1 0 1 
4 1 0 0 
5 0 1 1 
6 0 1 0 
7 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 
 
And we have the following M = 64 Markov states: 
 
Фt Ψt Ψt–1 
1 1 1 
2 1 2 
… … … 
7 1 7 
8 1 8 
9 2 1 
10 2 2 
11 2 3 
… … … 
62 8 6 
63 8 7 
64 8 8 
Example of a Decision Step  
Suppose a firm is seeking to choose a price. We partition this choice into two components: 
(1) an integer component for disposition (σD) and (2) a floating-point component for magnitude 
(σM). Disposition denotes the direction of the action taken, and magnitude denotes the extent of 
the action taken. For example, the disposition of a firm with respect to price can fall into one of 
three discrete categories. The firm can increase the price, lower the price, or hold the price 
constant. These three options are represented in the following chart by three possible values of 
σD: 
 
σD =   1 
= –1 
=   0 
raise: Pt+1 > Pt 
lower: Pt+1 < Pt 
neither 
 
Once a firm has decided its disposition toward pricing, it must decide the corresponding 
magnitude for this action. For example, if a firm decides to increase the price, will it increase the 
price a little or a lot? Magnitude denotes the new price as a proportion of the current price: 
σM = P1/P0 ∈ [0, ∞).  
 
In principle, it seems reasonable for a firm to first ask, “Should I raise or lower a price?” and 
then to ask, “OK, how much?” In practice, the disposition component (σD) allows for a discrete 
set of options from which the firm can choose. Discrete (rather than continuous) choices are 
important features for practical implementation of the decision algorithm.  
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Disposition: For a given Markov state, say Φ0 = 5, a firm has three options: 
 
 
 
This policy table (above) contains quite a bit of information. It shows that the firm was 
previously in direct state 5 (since Ψ–1 = 5), which implies the previous period had profit 
decreasing (ψ1 = 0), inventory increasing (ψ2 = 1), and average costs increasing (ψ3 = 1). The 
chart shows that the firm is currently in direct state 1, in which profit is now increasing (ψ1 = 1).   
 
To understand how the firm selects from the three options, we introduce a strength 
parameter: ω ∈ [0, 1]. The strength of each option in the current state represents the likelihood of 
selecting that option. For this example, we would have initiated all options at the start of the 
simulation to have equal strength (ω = 0.33). However, each time an option is selected 
throughout the simulation, ω is increased or decreased depending on whether the decision 
resulted in a higher fitness for the firm. Suppose our current options have the following strengths 
(shown in the fifth, i.e., ω, column): 
 
Φ0 Ψ0 Ψ–1   σD ω σM 
5 1 5    1 0.3 1.4 
5 1 5    0 0.5  
5 1 5  –1 0.2 0.4 
 
Choices and Magnitude: The three rows in the chart above imply three prospects: (1) a 30% 
chance of increasing the price by 40%, (2) a 50% chance of holding the price constant, and (3) a 
20% chance of decreasing the price by 60%.  
Example of an Evaluation Step   
Suppose that (in the previous decision step) the algorithm selected the first option (increase 
price by 40%). The firm then sets its price accordingly and proceeds through a series of 
execution steps in which the firm sells its product in the marketplace. When the firm gets to the 
next evaluation step, it will determine whether fitness has increased or decreased. 
 
Suppose that fitness has increased. In this case, the firm concludes that it made the correct 
choice for the given situation and increases the parameter ω(Φ=5, σD=1) by some proportion. This 
step will increase the strength of that option (price increase) and thereby increase the probability 
of selecting the same option the next time the firm finds itself in state Φ = 5. If fitness had 
decreased, the firm would have decreased the strength of the price increase option. 
 
Continuing with the supposition that fitness has increased, we want the firm to consider 
whether it adjusted the price by the proper proportion. Based on well-founded economic 
principle and our theoretical framework, the firm experiences declining quantity demanded 
(sales) as the price rises. This implies that increasing the price will only increase profits to a 
point, but eventually fitness will begin to decline as a result of declining sales. We incorporate 
Φ0 Ψ0 Ψ–1   σD 
5 1 5    1 
5 1 5    0 
5 1 5  –1 
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this principle by allowing the firm to adjust σM whenever it adjusts ω. Thus, once the firm 
determines that price increases are beneficial, it increases both ω and σM. Suppose the firm 
repeatedly finds itself in state Φ = 5 and increasingly selects the first option (price increase) until 
σM approaches unity and fitness starts to decline upon evaluation. In response to such declining 
fitness, the firm will then begin to reduce the proportion of price increases whenever the price 
increase option is chosen. By adjusting the magnitude parameter, we expect the firm to converge 
to an optimal proportion of price increases.11   
Remarks   
The learning algorithms proposed above describe a general approach, which we will likely 
modify and extend during implementation of actual simulations.   
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Overview of Households 
Possibly the most fundamental agent in any market-based economic simulation is the 
household. The preferences of the households determine work effort, production incentives, 
prices, and interest rates. Households define the ends of virtually all market-based activity: the 
consumption of final goods and services.12 
 
Unlike firms, households do not usually arise out of the pursuit of economic efficiency; they 
are a more fundamental social grouping. The primary distinction between households and firms 
in our models lies in their economic motivations. We model firms as being motivated by some 
direct financial measure such as fitness. We model households as being motivated by some 
abstract concept of utility. However, household utility clearly relates to household finances 
because a necessary component of utility is the consumption of goods and services, which are 
generally purchased in markets. We, therefore, find similarities in the financial decision 
processes of households and firms. 
 
We present a model of household financial planning based upon the conventional principles 
of utility theory and intertemporal substitution. We then present an evolutionary learning 
algorithm by which household agents can systematically learn to modify their savings and 
investment decisions in an optimal fashion. This method is a step toward a model of consumer 
confidence. Ultimately, we will define a method by which households continually allocate funds 
between three options: current consumption, [risk-free] savings, and [risky] stock investments.   
 
In general, households earn income and consume final goods and services, and attempt to do 
so in a fashion that maximizes utility (see the discussion of utility under Financial Planning 
below). We will design a C++ class to handle the data structures and methods that are required by 
households. Examples of data structures might include a list of desired consumption goods that 
must be purchased, or an array of stocks held in an investment portfolio. An example of a 
method might include an income-allocation method that apportions current income among 
consumption, savings, and risky investments. 
 
Key aspects of our implementation of households include the following: 
 
Labor Markets: Households must usually earn income to purchase products. They earn 
income by entering the labor market, working for a firm, and earning a wage.  
 
Product Markets: Households consume by purchasing products in the final goods markets 
(i.e., consumer goods markets or retail markets). Households consume bundles of products based 
                                                 
12 Consumption refers to the use of final goods and services purchased by households for their own use.  
Consumption excludes household purchases made for the purpose of producing and selling goods and services. For 
example, a household’s purchases of office products for a home business are not included as household 
consumption; such items are considered intermediate goods used for the creation of additional goods and services.  
As demonstrated above, goods and services are classified as intermediate or final based on their intended use.  
Intermediate goods are those used to produce other goods for sale to firms or households, whereas final goods are 
those sold strictly to households and strictly for “personal” use. As a rule-of-thumb, final goods and services are 
those purchases by households classified as personal expenses, rather than as business expenses, for tax purposes. 
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on their internal preferences and the relative product prices, and they substitute between products 
based on the relative price changes.   
 
Financial Markets: Households can earn income in the form of capital gains by investing in 
the stock market. Capital gains represent a return for risk taking and patience; the household 
foregoes consumption in one time period for the prospect of earning a return in a later period. 
 
Savings and Net Worth: Households generally save portions of their income to handle spikes 
in consumption or to maintain consumption levels during possible periods of unemployment.  
Households generally increase their net worth through savings during earlier phases of their life 
cycle, then consume their new worth during retirement.   
 
Consumption and Life-Cycle Utility: Households will seek to optimize some set of 
objectives. A household’s objectives will generally be defined by some measure of fitness that 
itself is defined by discounted utility derived from consumption.13 All household activity and 
decisions will center on that fitness measure. The foremost decision will be to determine 
consumption levels. Related to that decision will be decisions regarding savings and investment.   
Work Effort 
Before examining how households spend their income, we first examine a more basic trade-
off: the trade-off between leisure and work effort. We treat leisure as a form of consumption for 
the household; that is, more leisure makes the household better off. However, spending time at 
work rather than at leisure generates income, which allows the household to consume goods and 
services. Therefore, households choose between leisure and consumption.   
 
Here, we present the simplest of representations of this relationship with a one-period 
model. We adopt the convention that utility (U) is monotonic with respect to each of two factors, 
consumption expenditure (C) and leisure (L). We use the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function 
 
U = [Lα·Cβ]λ, 
 
where α and β ∈ [0, 1]. This simple model is graphed in Figure 1, wherein we see that utility 
increases with respect to both leisure and consumption.   
 
                                                 
13 Eventually, we might incorporate the concept of leisure as a form of consumption. For the foreseeable future, 
however, we will implicitly address this principle by defining utility as an exponential function of consumption with 
homogeneity of degree less than one. This cavalier treatment of leisure will be corrected later.   
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Figure 1. Household utility as a function of leisure and consumption. 
Elasticity 
The Cobb-Douglas is a constant elasticity function, which means that a 1% change in either 
of its inputs always results in the same percent change in utility, regardless of the levels of the 
inputs. To demonstrate, we consider the following logarithmic transformation: 
  
ln(U) = ln[LαּCβ]λ. 
 
It follows that ln(U) = αּln(L) + βּln(C), and differentiation yields β = ∂ln(U)/∂ln(C). Using the 
approximation ∂ln(y)/∂ln(x) ≈ %∆y/%∆x, we find that a 1% increase in consumption (C) results 
in a β% increase in total utility. We call β the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. 
Similarly, we call α the elasticity of utility with respect to leisure. 
Budget Constraint 
Each household must budget its time between leisure and work. If we introduce H ≡ total 
hours available for work and leisure, then W ≡ hours of work = H – L. Thus, L(W) = H – W. C 
represents consumption expenditure. If we let w ≡ wage rate, then C(W) = w·W. Thus, U is an 
implicit function of W such that U = U(L(W), C(W)). The first-order condition provides optimal 
work effort: W* = βH/(α + β).   
 
 For example, suppose that there are H = 126 hours per week available for work and 
leisure (18 hours/day). Further suppose that w = 3, α = 0.7, β = 0.3, and λ = 3. These parameters 
imply that W* ≈ 38 hours. The utility function with respect to work effort is shown in Figure 2; 
we see that utility is maximized at W*= 38. 
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Figure 2. Household utility as a function of work effort. 
Once we know the optimal work effort, W*, as derived above, we can derive the optimal 
bundle of income and leisure. The optimal household income is Y* = w⋅W*. For the one-period 
model, the household spends all of its income on consumption; thus, the optimal consumption 
expenditure is C* = w⋅W* = $144, and the optimal leisure is L* = 88 hours. This bundle is 
represented by a single point in Figure 3, which is identical to Figure 1, but as viewed from 
above.14 The optimal point is shown in Figure 3 at the intersection of two lines. This chart 
illustrates the importance for a household to balance its time between work and play. All work 
and no play would put the household on the vertical axis with zero utility. All play and no work 
would put the household on the horizontal axis with zero utility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bird’s eye view of household utility function. 
                                                 
14 The curves in Figure 3 are called preference curves or indifference curves because all points on a given curve 
represent the same level of utility. The slope of an indifference curve at any point is called the marginal rate of 
substitution; the slope describes how much one good must be increased to make up for the decrease in the other 
good to maintain the same level of utility (thus making the household indifferent toward the trade-off). These 
conventions can be found in any textbook of economic principles. 
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Credit Market 
The credit market allows borrowers and lenders to exchange liquidity in the form of loans. 
We shall explore the underlying economic forces that create this market. Consider the following 
two-period utility function15: 
 
U = U1θ1⋅U2θ2, 
 
where Ut is the utility realized in the tth period. The utility in each period is defined as before:  
U1 = [L1α·C1β], and U2 = [L2α·C2β]. U is therefore a joint utility for both periods and is plotted in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Two-period household utility function. 
To explore this relationship, we transform the utility function by the natural logarithm: 
 
ln(U) = θ1⋅ln(U1) + θ2⋅ln(U2). 
  
The following partial derivatives provide our interpretation of the temporal coefficients (θ1 
and θ2): 
 
∂ln(U)/∂ln(U1) = θ1, 
∂ln(U)/∂ln(U2) = θ2. 
 
Using the approximation ∂ln(y)/∂ln(x) ≈ %∆y/%∆x, we find that a 1% increase in first-
period utility results in a θ1% increase in total utility. Similarly, a 1% increase in second-period  
                                                 
15 See any microeconomics textbook. 
0
800
1600
2400
3200
4000
4800
0 750 1500 2250 3000 3750 4500 5250075
0
15
0022
5030
0037
5045
0052
50
U1
U2
 35 
utility results in a θ2% increase in total utility. To simplify the notation, let u = ln(U) and 
ut = u(Ct) = ln(Ut) = ln(U(Ct)). Thus, the previous equation becomes 
 
u = θ1⋅u1 + θ2⋅u2. 
 
If we assume the same parameters from the one-period example for each period in this 
example, and assume that the household cannot store or borrow consumption across time 
periods, then θ1 and θ2 will not affect the optimal level of consumption and leisure in each 
period: C1* = C2* = $144, and L1* = L2* = 88 hours. Therefore, U1* = U2*. 
Savings 
Now suppose that the household had a mechanism by which it could save or borrow 
consumption from period 1 to period 2. Let us examine the conditions under which the firm 
would have an incentive to do so. We derive the first-order condition as follows: 
 
du/dC2 = ∂u/∂Uּ ∂U/∂U2 ּ∂U2/∂C2 +  ∂u/∂Uּ ∂U/∂U1 ּ∂U1/∂C1 ּdC1/dC2 ≡ 0, 
 
where 
∂u/∂U = 1/U,  
∂U/∂Ut = θtU/Ut,  
∂Ut/∂Ct = βUt/Ct. 
 
Thus, 
du/dC2 = βθ2/C2 + (βθ1/C1) ּdC1/dC2. 
 
We address the substitution term (dC1/dC2) by introducing the two-period budget constraint 
M1 = Y1 + Y2/(1 + r), which represents the total present value of income from both periods. The 
term r ≥ 0 represents the market interest rate, and Y2/(1 + r) ≤ Y2 represents the present (period 
1) value of period 2 income when discounted by the market rate. M1 (budget constraint) provides 
a borrowing mechanism whereby we can substitute consumption between periods: 
M1 = C1 + C2/(1 + r). This gives C1 = M1 – C2/(1 + r), so dC1/dC2 = –1/(1 + r) ∈ [–1, 0). Thus, 
the first-order condition is 
 
du/dC2 = θ2/C2 – (θ1/C1)/(1 + r) ≡ 0. 
 
It follows that 
C2/C1 = (1 + r)⋅θ2/θ1. 
 
Holding w and Wt constant, we now examine three dispositions toward saving and 
borrowing, as listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Conditions for Saving Between Adjacent Periods 
Case Result Condition 
no substitution C2/C1 = 1 θ2/θ1 = 1/(1+ r) 
savings C2/C1 > 1 θ2/θ1 > 1/(1+ r) 
borrowing C2/C1 < 1 θ2/θ1 < 1/(1+ r) 
 
Discount Rate 
We have determined that a household’s disposition toward savings depends upon the 
relationship between the market interest rate (r) and the household’s temporal preferences (θ). 
This relationship is described by the comparison of two ratios: θ2/θ1 against 1/(1 + r). We would 
like to redefine one of the ratios to provide a more intuitive comparison. Since r can be observed 
and θ cannot, we will redefine θ2/θ1 in such a way that we can make a more direct comparison 
between the market interest rate and each specific household’s time preferences. We introduce 
the internal discount rate d ≡ (θ1 – θ2)/θ2, such that θ2/θ1 ≡ 1/(1 + d). The household discount rate 
(d) has similar form and interpretation as the market interest rate (r), except that it represents the 
rate at which the individual household is willing to borrow or save.   
 
The internal discount rate (d) can vary across households, whereas the market interest rate 
(r) is the same for all households. This is because r is determined by the aggregate demand and 
supply of savings across all households. To explain, 1/(1 + r) and 1/(1 + d) are prices for 
substituting between periods. They are analogous to prices in the standard sense. Suppose that P 
is the market price for televisions, and D is the price that a particular household is willing to pay 
for a television. If D > P, the household will buy the television. If D < P, the household will not 
buy the television. Therefore, some households will buy a television, while others will not; 
however, all households must make that decision based on the same market price: P. Similarly, if 
d > r, which implies that 1/(1 + d) < 1/(1 + r), the household will borrow. If d < r, which implies 
that 1/(1 + d) > 1/(1 + r), the household will save. 
 
We assert that θ1 > θ2; that is, households discount the value of future consumption relative 
to current consumption. This assertion is supported by the fact that we observe positive interest 
rates in real-world economies. However, given a market-determined interest rate (r), a household 
will still only borrow or save based on the relation of its internal discount rate to the market rate. 
If a particular household has a relatively low discount rate, such as d ∈ [0, r), the household will 
save16. If a particular household has a relatively high discount rate, such as d > r, the household 
will borrow. Note that both of these examples of relative preference are valid even if we assume 
it is always the case that θ1 > θ2. Therefore, lending and borrowing under a positive interest rate 
occurs even if all households prefer current to future consumption; that is, even if all households 
discount the future.   
 
                                                 
16 Household savings generally take the form of bank deposits, which support loans to borrowers. Thus, a 
proper description of credit markets refers to savers as lenders. In this paper, however, we seek only to describe the 
decisions of individual households, not the structure of the credit market, so we use the term saver instead of lender. 
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Financial Planning 
To address the household’s objectives over a multiple-period time horizon, we extend the 
original utility function as follows: 
 
U = U1θ⋅U2θ2⋅…⋅Unθn. 
 
We can generalize the first-order condition for substitution between periods 1 and 2 (from 
the previous example) to examine substitution between periods 1 and t: 
 
du/dCt = βθt/Ct + (βθ1/C1)ּ dC1/dCt ≡ 0. 
 
The term dC1/dCt represents the trade-off in consumption across several time periods. We 
discount a future value across several periods by applying the discount factor 1/(1 + r) for each 
time period. So, dC1/dCt = 1/(1 + r)t–1. It follows that 
 
Ct/C1 = (1+r)t–1⋅θt/θ1. 
 
As in the two-period model, we can consider the conditions under which the household 
substitutes between current consumption (in period 1) and future consumption (in period t). 
These conditions are listed in Table 3.  
Table 3. Conditions for Saving Between Any Two Periods 
Case Result Condition 
no substitution Ct/C1 = 1 θt/θ1 = 1/(1 + r)t–1 
savings Ct/C1 > 1 θt/θ1 > 1/(1 + r)t–1 
borrowing Ct/C1 < 1 θt/θ1 < 1/(1 + r)t–1 
 
In the two-period model, we introduced “d” such that θ2/θ1 ≡ 1/(1 + d). We now generalize 
this relationship such that θt/θ1 ≡ 1/(1 + d)t–1, which implies that households discount between 
two periods based on the number of intermediate periods. By transforming our utility  
(U = ∏ Utθt) into the log-linear form (u = ∑ θt⋅ut ) we can divide by θ1 to obtain 
 
u = ∑ ut/(1 + d)t–1. 
 
This format assumes that time preference is constant between each adjacent time period. In 
reality, households’ time preferences can change from period to period based on various factors. 
Such a case of changing time preference would be denoted by a unique discount rate for each 
period: u = ∑ ut/(1 + dt)t–1, where dt ≠ dt+i. Literature pertaining to life-cycle models explores 
cases of changing time preferences with respect to age-specific factors. However, we find it 
practical to assume that each household’s time preference is constant across time; that is, each 
household’s discount rate is the same for all time periods (dt = dt+i ∀ t,i). We discuss this later. 
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Substituting the identity θt/θ1 ≡ 1/(1 + d)t–1 into the first-order condition gives a general 
relationship between preferred consumption levels across time periods: 
 
Ct/C1 = [(1 + r)/(1 + d)]t–1, 
 
which allows us to derive some intuitive results. Let st = Ct/C1. We have ∂st/∂r > 0, which 
implies that a rise in the market interest rate increases all households’ preference for future 
consumption relative to current consumption, resulting in a general increase in households’ 
propensity to save. We have ∂st/∂d < 0, which implies that a rise in an individual household’s 
internal discount rate increases that household’s preference for current consumption relative to 
future consumption.  
Budget Constraint (revisited) 
For the one-period case, we explored how each household must budget its time between 
leisure and work. If we assume that work effort conforms to a constant number of hours (W) 
based on social norms (such as the 8-hour workday or the 40-hour workweek), then leisure is 
constant. It follows that income (Y) in each period is a function of wage (w): Yt = wtּW. Thus, 
the present value of the household’s income stream (for T periods) is B = ∑T Yt/(1 + r)t–1, where r 
is the market interest rate. Assuming that the household has no initial endowment of wealth and 
that the household can borrow at rate r, it follows that B represents the household’s budget 
constraint for all current and future consumption in present-value terms: 
 
Budget Constraint: ∑T Ct/(1 + r)t–1 ≤ ∑T Yt/(1 + r)t–1. 
 
Any endowments of wealth A0 > 0 in the current period (t = 0) are added to the budget 
constraint in the current period: B0 = A0 + ∑T Yt/(1 + r)t–1. If the household wants to retain a final 
wealth AT (discussed below), then the budget is reduced by the discounted value of the final 
wealth. We have 
 
Budget Constraint: ∑T Ct/(1 + r)t–1 ≤ A0 + ∑T Yt/(1 + r)t–1 – AT/(1 + r)T. 
 
This is an underlying constraint for the following discussions of consumption and utility, and it 
will be explicitly addressed in descriptions of the households’ planning algorithm. 
Net Worth and the Life Cycle 
A household has many factors to consider when planning its future: How many children 
should it have? How many vacations should it take? What size house should it buy? When 
should household members retire? Are there any semiretirement options? What are the life 
expectancies of household members? What is the likelihood of illness or disability? How might 
disabilities reduce earning potential? We do not want our model to restrict households regarding 
such choices, nor do we want to explicitly model all of these considerations. We require a model 
that (1) encapsulates the financial choices associated with these questions and (2) is consistent 
with the assumption that households will answer these questions differently. 
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Households also consider the likelihood that their utility will change with age. We get 
advice such as “Live life while you’re young,” and “Spend your money while you can enjoy it.” 
These suggestions seem to assume that an individual’s utility from consumption will decline 
with age (βt > βt+i). This assumption has two implications. First, households will discount 
consumption in the distant future at a greater rate than consumption in the near future. Second, 
older households will discount the future at a greater rate than younger households. Of course, 
the opposite could also be true. Some households might heavily discount current consumption as 
they work toward their goals for the future. We do not want our model to restrict households 
regarding such preferences, nor do we want a complicated model of lifetime planning functions 
with changing time preferences.   
 
We address our model requirements by limiting the household’s planning process to periods 
within a near-term planning horizon. The near-term planning horizon is defined simply to be the 
number of time periods for which the discount rate is constant. The length of this planning 
horizon can vary across households. The horizon ends with a target date (T). The household 
seeks to achieve a target new worth (AT) by the end of the planning horizon. The target date 
represents the termination of the current planning horizon. The household’s net worth at the end 
of its current planning phase will be the household’s endowment at the beginning of its next 
planning phase. The household utility under this model is defined as follows: 
 
u = ∑T [ut/(1 + d)t–1]  +  u(AT)/(1 + d)T. 
 
This framework is consistent with many economic interpretations, depending simply on the 
choice of T and A. We now explore some possible variations and interpretations of this model. 
Finite Horizon 
It is possible in this framework to assume that AT = 0, which implies that the household 
plans to consume all of its wealth by date T and have no net wealth at the end. This assumption 
fits several interpretations. For example, if T is a planned retirement date, and AT = 0, then such 
a household might expect to be supported solely by its children and social security upon 
retirement. Alternately, the household might have no plans to retire, and T might represent the 
anticipated date of death. 
Infinite Horizon 
Suppose T = ∞, which implies that A = 0 and u = ∑∞ ut/(1 + d)t–1. This case is studied in the 
context of various macroeconomic topics, particularly the issue of public debt. We do not intend 
to employ the case T = ∞ in our model, but we present it for completeness and to demonstrate the 
generalness of our approach for subsequent application. 
 
An infinite planning horizon is particularly simple to employ in a simulation if two 
conditions are satisfied. Condition 1 is that the function ut does not change across time periods, 
which implies that the household’s preference for consumption relative to leisure is constant  
(αt = α and βt = β ∀ t). Condition 2 is that the household consumes at a constant level  
(Ct = C ∀ t). These two conditions imply the following [simple] utility function: u = ut(C)/d. 
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Additive Horizon   
The additive horizon, defined when T is finite and AT > 0, provides a simple means to 
employ a variety of time preferences within the model’s agents.  
 
The most obvious interpretation for T is retirement date. Under this interpretation, the 
household plans to earn income through period T and retire with net worth AT. Net worth could 
include cash or home equity, or it could include income-generating assets such as stocks, bonds, 
or real estate.17 Under this interpretation, households that put money into savings are 
contributing toward retirement. Such contribution will increase net worth (∂AT/∂Ct < 0 ∀ t < T). 
 
A variation of the previous interpretation is a household that is planning to resign from a job 
at date T and start a business, where the business requires initial start-up capital of AT. 
 
Of course, T does not have to represent a career change. It could simply represent a financial 
milestone set by the household for any reason. 
Bequeaths 
The additive horizon allows us to introduce an infinite horizon component for cases of 
bequeaths. For example, AT could represent a trust or an inheritance or some other form of 
bequeath left by the household as an endowment for beneficiaries. The size of the bequeath will 
depend on the utility derived by the household out of its concern for the beneficiaries; this utility 
is denoted by u(AT) > 0. Suppose the endowment takes the form of a trust that will provide a 
perpetual annuity for some group of beneficiaries. The household knows that an annual payment 
(Pt>T) will be made to the beneficiaries, and it derives utility of u(Pt>T) > 0 from that knowledge. 
The utility from each payment is discounted, so that the discounted value in period T of u(Pt>T) 
will be u(Pt>T)/(1 + δ), where δ is the discount rate for payments to beneficiaries. In period T, the 
household’s total present utility from the perpetuity, u(Pt)/δ, will equal the utility of the bequeath 
itself, AT. Thus, in time t < T, the household can compute its present utility from all future 
payments to beneficiaries as the discount value of the bequeath itself: 
ubequeath = u(AT)/(1 + d)T–t = u(Pt)/[δּ(1 + d)T–t]. Note: This framework allows for d ≠ δ, which 
would imply that the household discounts its own consumption at a different rate than it 
discounts the consumption of its beneficiaries. 
Salient Features   
The additive horizon provides a practical and versatile format for handling household 
planning horizons. First, if empirical data are available, then T and AT can be generated for the 
household agents according to some empirically estimated distribution. Second, whether T and 
AT are generated from an empirically estimated distribution or some otherwise assumed 
distribution, the method will allow analysts to study impacts on agent behavior due to variation 
                                                 
17 We do not need to explicitly define all of the components for AT. The key here is to assume that the 
household determines its own target net worth. We need only to define the value of AT. For the purpose of 
simulating many households, we can define target net worth as a stochastic variable and generate the value of AT as 
the households are created. 
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in the distribution of T and AT. Third, T and AT can be defined by variables in the model, and T 
and AT can be continually recalculated by the household based on incoming information or 
modified by the household as part of the household planning process. 
Planning Algorithm 
We present a process whereby household agents behave according to an evolutionary 
learning algorithm. In each planning phase, the household estimates its current fitness (derived in 
part from financial variables), determines its current state of being, and specifies the values for 
two choice variables: consumption and savings. The process could be extended to include 
investment (a risky form of savings) as a third choice variable, but we shall ignore investment in 
this discussion.  
Fitness  
Fitness is an estimate of expected utility. Utility is defined as the discounted value of the 
household’s planned consumption stream from now (t = 0) through time T: 
 
Utility ≡ ∑T u(Ct)/(1 + d)t–1 +  u(AT)/(1 + d)T. 
 
This function is a Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, and is therefore valid even if 
the households are uncertain regarding future consumption levels (Ct>1), perhaps due to a 
dependence on uncertain prices, or uncertain regarding future time preferences (dt>1) or 
consumption preferences (βt>1), perhaps due to uncertain health18. We introduce the notation E[x] 
to denote the expected value of x based upon some estimation process. Let ute denote E[ut] and 
Cte denote E[Ct], so that 
 
Expected utility ≡ ∑T ue( Cte )/(1 + d)t–1 +  ue(ATe)/(1 + d)T. 
 
The introduction of time-dependent and state-dependent uncertainties, such as those 
mentioned above, restricts the household’s ability to forecast future utility, and therefore restricts 
its ability to estimate expected utility for a set of choice variables.   
State Variables  
We address the uncertainties described above by introducing a set of state variables (Ψ) to 
represent all exogenous variables in the utility function.19     
                                                 
18 In either or both cases, the utility is a monotonic linear transformation of the expected utilities in each time 
period, E[ut] = ∫ut/Ct dCt, and satisfies the expected utility property. 
19 In this model, Cte, ATe, and T are examples of possible choice variables because they can be set by the 
household during the planning process to increase utility. In contrast, dt (discount rate), βt (consumption elasticity), 
and wt (wage) are examples of state variables because they are determined outside of the household’s planning 
process; they are either imposed by the simulation or set by other agents. 
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Savings  
A household must allocate its income between consumption and savings. Let U0 denote 
expected utility in the current time period. The household seeks to maximize 
 
U0 ≡ U0( C0, S0 | Ψ0, {Ψt}, B ), 
 
where C0 is the current consumption expenditure, S0 is the current allocation to savings, Ψ0 is the 
current state, {Ψt} is the set of future states, and B is the expected all-period budget constraint. 
 
Savings is defined with respect to current income (Y0) and current net worth (A0) as follows:  
S0 = Y0 – C0, which implies dS0/dC0 = dC0/dS0 = –1. If we assume that all states are fixed, then 
 
dU0/dS0 |Ψ = ∂U0/∂S0 + ∂U0/∂C0ּdC0/dS0 = ∂U0/∂S0 – ∂U0/∂C0ּ 
 
The term ∂U0/∂C0 > 0 is the partial utility of current consumption. The term ∂U0/∂S0 > 0 is the 
partial utility of future consumption (via savings)20. The net utility from additional savings could 
be positive or negative depending on the relative utility from current versus future consumption.   
State Transition   
We allow for the possibility that a household’s current choices might influence its future 
states: ∂{Ψt}/∂S0 ≠ 0. Let Ψ ≡ {Ψt}. We have 
 
dU0/dS0 = dU0/dS0 |Ψ + ∂U0/∂Ψּ∂Ψ/∂S0. 
 
Now we allow for multiple state variables (Ψt = {ψit}) to obtain 
 
dU0/dS0 = dU0/dS0 |Ψ + ∑i ∂U0/∂ψiּ∂ψi/∂S0. 
Example of an Assessment Step   
In any planning phase, given the current state, a household must try to determine two results 
that might occur from further savings. First, will the increased utility from additional future 
consumption outweigh the decreased utility from foregone current consumption? Second, will 
further savings move the household into a better or worse state for future decisions?   
 
We will not define an optimization problem whereby households try to derive an optimal 
amount of savings analytically, using mathematical calculations. Instead, the households will 
learn how to respond in specific states. In Table 4, we define three direct state variables 
corresponding to utility. 
 
                                                 
20 We have ∂U0/∂S0 = ∑T ∂Cte/∂S0 + ∂ATe/∂S0  > 0. The magnitude of each of the T+1 partial derivatives on the 
right-hand side of this equation depends on the household allocation of savings and all future states, but we know 
that each term is ≥ 0. 
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Table 4. Definition of State Variables 
ψ1 = 1 
= 0 
if consumption is increasing: dCt/dt > 0 
otherwise 
ψ2 = 1 
= 0 
if assets are increasing: dAt/dt > 0 
otherwise 
ψ3 = 1 
= 0 
if assets exceed target: A0 > AT 
otherwise 
In this case, we have n = 3 state variables. For any such collection of indicator (true or false) 
state variables, there are N = 2n states. In this case, we have N = 23 = 8 states for period t, where 
the set of possible direct states in period t is denoted by Ψt = Ψ{ψ1t, ψ2t, ψ3t}. 
 
We also want households to respond with regard to state transitions. We introduce a new set 
of Markov states: Φt = Φ{Ψt, Ψt–1}. There are Mt = NtּNt–1 possible Markov states (in our model, 
N and M are constant across time). For our example, we have the following N = 8 direct states: 
 
Ψ ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 0 
3 1 0 1 
4 1 0 0 
5 0 1 1 
6 0 1 0 
7 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 
 
And we have the following M = 64 Markov states: 
 
Фt Ψt Ψt–1 
1 1 1 
2 1 2 
3 1 3 
4 1 4 
5 1 5 
6 1 6 
7 1 7 
8 1 8 
9 2 1 
10 2 2 
11 2 3 
… … … 
62 8 6 
63 8 7 
64 8 8 
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Example of a Decision Step  
A household must choose a level of savings. We partition this choice into two components: 
(1) an integer component for disposition (σD) and (2) a floating-point component for magnitude 
(σM). Disposition denotes the direction of the action taken, and magnitude denotes the extent of 
the action taken.  For example, the disposition of a household with respect to savings can fall 
into one of three discrete categories: (1) the household might choose to save some of its income; 
(2) the household might choose to spend more than its income by borrowing extra money; or 
(3) the household might spend the exact amount of its income, neither saving nor borrowing.  
These three options are represented in the following chart by three possible values of σD: 
 
σD =   1 
= –1 
=   0 
save: S0 = Y0 – C0 > 0 
borrow: S0 = Y0 – C0 < 0 
neither 
 
Once a household has decided its disposition toward saving, it must decide the 
corresponding magnitude for this action. For example, if a household decides to be a saver, will 
it be a big saver, a moderate saver, or a minor saver? Magnitude denotes the level of savings as a 
share of income: σM = S0/Y0 ∈ [0, 1]. We partition the savings decision for the following 
reasons. In principle, it seems reasonable for a household to first ask, “Should I save or borrow?” 
and then ask, “OK, how much?” However, σD has a much more profound interpretation. It 
represents the household’s disposition toward savings given a particular state of being. It allows 
us to discretely classify the household as a saver or a borrower for a given state, which is an 
important distinction in credit markets. 
 
Disposition: In practice, the disposition component defines a discrete set of options from 
which a household can choose. This is an important feature for the sake of the decision 
algorithm, wherein we want the household to learn how to respond in certain circumstances.   
 
For a given Markov state, say Φ0 = 5, a household has three options: 
 
Φ0 Ψ0 Ψ–1   σD 
5 1 5    1 
5 1 5    0 
5 1 5  –1 
 
This policy table contains quite a bit of information. It shows that the household was previously 
in direct state 5, which implies the previous period had consumption decreasing (ψ1 = 0), savings 
increasing (ψ2 = 1), and assets that exceeded the long-term asset goal (ψ3 = 1). The chart shows 
that the household is currently in direct state 1, in which consumption is now increasing (ψ1 = 1).   
 
To understand how the household selects from the three options, we introduce a strength 
parameter: ω ∈ [0, 1]. This represents the strength of each option in the current state, which 
determines the probability of selecting each option. For this example, we would have initiated all 
options at the start of the simulation to have equal strength (ω = 0.33). However, each time an 
option is selected throughout the simulation, ω is increased or decreased depending on whether 
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the decision resulted in a higher fitness for the household. Suppose our current options have the 
following strengths: 
 
Φ0 Ψ0 Ψ–1   σD ω σM 
5 1 5    1 0.3 0.2 
5 1 5    0 0.5  
5 1 5  –1 0.2 0.3 
 
Choice and Magnitude: Once the household decides whether to be a saver, a borrower, or 
neither, it must decide the extent of its disposition. For example, “I will be a big borrower,” or “I 
will borrow much.” The three rows in the chart above denote three prospects: (1) a 30% chance 
of saving 20% of income, (2) a 50% chance of spending all income, and (3) a 20% chance of 
borrowing 30% of income. The rightmost column, σM, contains the percentage of 
savings/borrowing in which the household will engage, once the disposition, σD has been 
selected. 
Example of an Evaluation Step   
Suppose that the algorithm selects the first option (save 20% of income). The household will 
then set its expenditure variable accordingly and proceed through a series of execution steps in 
which the household exchanges and adjusts its cash balance. When the household gets to the next 
decision phase, it will determine whether fitness has increased or decreased. 
 
Suppose that fitness has increased. In this case, the household concludes that it made the 
correct choice for the given situation and increases the parameter ω(Φ=5, σ σD=1) by some 
proportion. This step will increase the strength of that option (savings) and thereby increase the 
probability of selecting the same option the next time the household finds itself in state Φ = 5. If 
fitness had decreased, then the household would have decreased the strength of the savings 
option. 
 
Continuing with the supposition that fitness has increased, we want the household to 
consider whether it saved the proper proportion of income. Based on well-founded economic 
principle and our theoretical framework, the household experiences diminishing returns from 
increased consumption in any time period. This implies that increased savings will only benefit 
the household to a point, but fitness will eventually begin to decline as current consumption 
approaches zero. We incorporate this principle by allowing the firm to adjust σM whenever it 
adjusts ω. Thus, once the household determines that savings are beneficial, it increases both ω 
and σM. Suppose the household repeatedly finds itself in state Φ = 5, and increasingly selects the 
first option (savings) until σM approaches unity and fitness starts to decline upon evaluation. The 
household will then begin to reduce the amount of savings whenever the savings option is 
chosen. By adjusting the magnitude parameter, we expect the household to converge to an 
optimal proportion of income devoted to savings.21   
                                                 
21 Convergence of σM is only for those cases when the household selects the correct option. In our discussion, 
the economic structure causes the proportion of savings to converge to σM < 1. Unfortunately, the algorithm 
described here will also cause the strength to converge to ω < 1 even if it should not; that is, even if the savings 
option always improves fitness and other options always reduce fitness. We will correct this problem in the future. 
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Remarks   
The learning algorithm proposed above describes a general approach, which we will likely 
modify and extend upon implementation in an actual simulation. Nevertheless, we expect that 
the underlying economic framework and evolutionary learning method presented here will 
provide a sound and practical starting point for addressing the role of household financial 
planning in economic simulations. 
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Price Formation in the Stock Market 
We model the stock market as a continuous double auction conducted by a stock exchange 
agent that takes limit orders from household agents. Each order includes a buy/sell indicator, the 
number of shares to be traded, and the limit price for the order.22 Households seeking to 
participate in the market will submit limit orders based on recently reported stock prices. The 
exchange agent simply clears the market of open orders. We are not concerned with the precise 
rule by which the exchange agent clears the market, except that it satisfies some reasonable 
requirements (see Farmer 2001 for examples). 
 
In our model, households are investors, not arbitragers; we do not seek to model trading 
strategies. Households treat stocks as a high-risk, high-yield alternative to savings. Therefore, we 
are not concerned how each household selects a limit price, only that the limit prices satisfy 
some aggregate properties (Ilija and Farmer 2002). The deviation between market price and limit 
price will be random and will follow a power law. We are not concerned in this model whether 
the variance (of deviations of limit prices from market price) is constant across all households or 
varies across individual households or arbitrary groupings of households.   
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